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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the afternoon of March 15, 2019, the Prime Minister of 
New Zealand and thirty other select individuals received an email 
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containing a seventy-four page manifesto entitled “The Great 
Replacement.”1 Nine minutes later, the manifesto’s author, Brenton 
Tarrant, began a mass shooting at two Christchurch mosques that left 
over fifty worshippers dead in its wake.2 It was the deadliest terrorist 
attack in New Zealand’s history.3 
In the manifesto, which he also posted to a website popular 
with the alt-right called 8chan just minutes before the attacks, Tarrant 
intended to “set out his ideology, rationale, and self-justification for 
the impending atrocity,”4 which he himself described as a terrorist 
attack.5 Much of the manifesto was dedicated to lamenting a “white 
genocide” being committed by immigrants – particularly those from 
“Islamic nations.”6 Although Tarrant firmly denied working directly 
with any white nationalist groups or movements therein, he clarified 
that he “donated to many” and “interacted with many more.”7 
 
 1 Jacinda Ardern’s office received manifesto from Christchurch shooter minutes before 
attack, ABC NEWS (last updated Mar. 17, 2019, 8:04 AM), https://
www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-17/jacinda-ardern-christchurch-shooter-manifesto-
email/10909874; Brenton Tarrant, The Great Replacement, CRIME PREVENTION RES. 
CTR. (2019), https://crimeresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/The-Great-
Replacement-New-Zealand-Shooter.pdf. 
 2 Jacinda Ardern’s office received manifesto from Christchurch shooter minutes before 
attack, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2019, 8:04 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-
03-17/jacinda-ardern-christchurch-shooter-manifesto-email/10909874; Accused 
shooter in Christchurch mosque attacks that left 51 dead pleads not guilty to all charges in New 
Zealand court, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (June 14, 2019, 6:50 AM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3014443/accused-shooter-
christchurch-mosque-attacks-left-51-dead. 
 3 Graham Macklin, The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral 
Video Age, 12 CTC SENTINEL 1, 19 (2019), https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads
/2019/07/CTC-SENTINEL-062019.pdf. 
 4 Id. 
 5 ”Do you consider it a terrorist attack? By the definition, then yes. It is a 
terrorist attack.” Tarrant, supra note 1, at 12. 
 6 The Christchurch shooter wrote: “Was the attack ‘islamophobic’ [sic] in 
origin? Islamic nations in particular have high birth rates, regardless of race or 
ethnicity, and in this there was an anti-islamic [sic] motivation to the attacks, as well 
as a want for revenge against islam [sic] for the 1300 years of war and devastation 
that it has brought upon the people of the West and other peoples of the world.” 
Tarrant, supra note 1, at 13. 
 7 Id. at 10. 
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Five months after the Christchurch attacks, Patrick Crusius 
entered a Walmart in the border town of El Paso, Texas with an AK-
47 assault rifle.8 He proceeded to murder twenty-two shoppers, 
including eight Mexican nationals, before leaving the store and 
surrendering to authorities.9 Crusius told the authorities he spent the 
last ten hours driving to El Paso from Dallas, on the other side of the 
state, in order to kill “Mexicans.”10 
Nineteen minutes before he began his attack, Crusius posted 
his own manifesto on 8chan. “In general, I support the Christchurch 
shooter and his manifesto,” he wrote.11 Crusius further elaborated his 
views, stating that “This attack is a response to the Hispanic invasion 
of Texas. [ . . . ] I am simply defending my country from cultural and 
ethnic replacement brought on by an invasion.”12 Throughout the rest of 
his manifesto, Crusius explicitly and implicitly referenced various 
white supremacist ideologies as his justifications for committing the 
attack.13 
Can we simply classify such tragedies as isolated violent hate 
crimes? The media and public at large are increasingly questioning 
 
 8 Robert Moore & Mark Berman, El Paso suspect said he was targeting 




 9 Cedar Attanasio, El Paso mass shooting suspect pleads not guilty in 22 deaths, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/3fd473325d174
29784e91a3c8c7b3909. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Daniel Politi, El Paso Suspect Reportedly a Trump Supporter Who Wrote Racist, 
Anti-Immigrant Manifesto, SLATE (Aug. 3, 2019, 9:02 PM), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2019/08/el-paso-suspect-shooter-trump-racist-manifesto.html 
(emphasis added); see also Here’s the El Paso Shooter’s Full Manifesto: Read it Before You 
Believe the News, PULPIT & PEN (Aug. 2019), https://pulpitandpen.org/2019/08
/05/heres-the-el-paso-shooters-full-manifesto-read-it-before-you-believe-the-news 
[hereinafter El Paso Shooter’s manifesto] (supposedly the full text of the manifesto). 
 12 Id. (emphasis added). 
 13 Michael Davis, The Manifesto Posted On 8chan By Alleged El Paso Shooter 
Minutes Before Attack, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RES. INST. (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://www.memri.org/reports/manifesto-posted-8chan-alleged-el-paso-shooter-
minutes-attack#_ednref1. 
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this characterization given the increased frequency of domestic 
terrorist acts committed by lone wolves who identify with the alt-
right.14 Some news outlets, such as The New York Times,15 have 
extensively researched the connections between these attacks and 
maintain that the perpetrators are part of a single global white 
nationalist movement that continues to grow.16 However, while it is 
clear to many onlookers that these attacks are connected, they are not 
uniformly being investigated or prosecuted as acts of terrorism given 
that each has occurred in a different jurisdiction and has therefore 
been subject to varying domestic laws concerning terrorism. 
This article analyzes whether the statutes criminalizing 
terrorism in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United 
States are sufficient to address the further rise of such acts of alt-right 
terrorism. Part II explores the process by which these terrorists are 
radicalized by their participation in extremist online communities. In 
doing so, it further elaborates on the connections between recent 
terrorist attacks committed by supporters of the alt-right in Oslo, 
London, Christchurch, and El Paso. Part III focuses on the last three 
attacks mentioned, explaining how the statutes criminalizing 
terrorism in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United 
States applied or could have applied to each case, including why each 
attack should be classified as domestic terrorism. Part III also 
considers if anyone affiliated with their perpetrators through 
extremist online communities could have been criminally liable for 
encouraging terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, or 
conspiring to commit acts of terrorism in each respective jurisdiction. 
Part IV briefly summarizes the proceeding discussions and concludes 
that identifiable gaps in counter-terrorism laws in these jurisdictions 
 
 14 E.g., Nick Robins-Early, El Paso Was The Latest Target Of A Deadly, Global 
White Supremacist Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2019, 6:08 PM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/white-nationalist-el-paso-christchurch-
shooting_n_5d488476e4b0ca604e36aba0. 
 15 Weiyi Cai & Simone Landon, Attacks by White Extremists Are Growing. So 
Are Their Connections., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-extremist-terrorism-christchurch.html. 
 16 See also Colin P. Clarke, The Cult of Breivik, SLATE (Mar. 18, 2019, 2:56 
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/anders-breivik-new-zealand-
right-wing-terrorism-inspiration.html. 
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have been deliberately exploited by fringe elements of the alt-right in 
order to continue to inspire lone-wolves to commit acts of terrorism 
with relative impunity. These gaps may be closed by ensuring that 
committing an act of domestic terrorism is a defined criminal 
offense, that established groups that radicalize their perpetrators are 
outlawed, and that inciting terrorism is a crime which is enforced 
against the individuals who do so. Until they are, alt-right terrorism 
will continue to proliferate across the globe. 
II. THE RISE OF ALT-RIGHT EXTREMISM 
A. Common Ideologies 
Some commentators trace the alarming rise of domestic 
terrorism committed by lone-wolves affiliated with the alt-right back 
to the attacks committed by Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist who 
killed seventy-seven people in a bombing and mass shooting near 
Oslo, Norway in 2011.17 Like the Christchurch and El Paso shooters, 
Breivik disseminated a manifesto online shortly before beginning his 
attack.18 It was over 1,500 pages long and entitled “2083: A European 
Declaration of Independence.”19 Throughout the manifesto, Breivik 
warns against the many dangers of “multiculturalism,” which he 
describes as “the root cause of the ongoing Islamisation of Europe 
which has resulted in the ongoing Islamic colonisation of Europe 
through demographic warfare (facilitated by [Europe’s] own 
leaders).”20 
This was Breivik’s invocation of the Great Replacement 
Theory, which was similarly the subject of the manifestos of the 
Christchurch and El Paso attackers. Its basic underlying idea is that 
“white European populations are being deliberately replaced at an 
 
 17 Cai & Landon, supra note 17. 
 18 Matthew Taylor, Breivik sent ‘manifesto’ to 250 UK contacts hours before 
Norway killings, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011, 6:58 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/26/breivik-manifesto-email-uk-contacts. 
 19 Anders Breivik, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, PUBLIC 
INTELLIGENCE (2011), 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf . 
 20 Id. 
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ethnic and cultural level through migration and the growth of 
minority communities.”21 Many subscribers to the theory – including 
the Christchurch attacker – describe this process as a “white 
genocide.”22 These individuals are part of the fringes of the alt-right 
movement, an already rather fringe movement which has been defined 
as “a set of far-right ideologies, groups and individuals whose core 
belief is that ‘white identity’ is under attack by multicultural forces 
using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white 
people and ‘their’ civilization.”23 The movement “encompasses a 
range of people on the extreme right who reject mainstream 
conservatism in favor of forms of conservatism that embrace implicit 
or explicit racism or white supremacy.” 24 Like many modern far-right 
collectives, it is highly decentralized, existing in the dark corners of 
the Internet on social media, online message boards, and the like. 
This makes the alt-right considerably “harder to monitor than other 
terrorist organizations, such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda, whose 
supporters operated within well-defined networks that are well 
known to law enforcement agencies.”25 
B. Radicalization Pathways 
Although such racist ideologies have been circulating in far-
right circles for many years, researchers observed that discussions 
about the Great Replacement Theory on Twitter steadily increased 
 
 21 Jacob Davey & Julia Ebner, ‘The Great Replacement’: The Violent 
Consequences of Mainstreamed Extremism, INST. FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 1, 7 
(2019), https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-Great-
Replacement-The-Violent-Consequences-of-Mainstreamed-Extremism-by-ISD.pdf. 
 22 Id. (“The Great Replacement theory is closely linked to other theories 
which are popular in white supremacist, ethno-nationalist and nativist circles, 
including the ideas of white genocide and Eurabia – with these concepts often used 
interchangeably.”) 
 23 ALT-RIGHT, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., https://www.splcenter
.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/alt-right (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). 
 24 Alt Right: A Primer about the New White Supremacy, ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE (2019), https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/alt-right-a-primer-
about-the-new-white-supremacy (last visited Sept. 2, 2019). 
 25 Cameron Houston & Shane Wright, Alt-right extremists are not being 
monitored effectively, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 17, 2019, 6.05 PM), 
https://www.smh.com.au/national/alt-right-extremists-are-not-being-monitored-
effectively-20190317-p514y0.html. 
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following Breivik’s attack in Oslo in 2011 and peaked following 
Tarrant’s attack in Christchurch in 2019.26 According to extremism 
expert J. M. Berger, the Theory is well-suited to inspiring violent 
extremism because it employs at least four of the five “crisis 
narratives” prevalent in extremist ideologies: conspiracy, dystopia, 
impurity, and existential threat.27 The inclusion of such narratives can 
determine an ideology’s potential for mobilizing audiences and 
inspiring violent action; Berger notes: 
Narratives function at the core of extremism; they 
fuel the process of self-identification with an in-group 
and link problems and grievances experienced by the 
in-group to the existence and actions of out-group(s). 
In particular, extremists use crisis narratives that imply that 
all crises experienced by the in-group can only be solved ‘through 
hostile action against the outgroup’.28 
Individuals who come to accept such an ideological 
framework may eventually ask themselves if they’re doing enough in 
response to the perceived crisis.29 If the answer is “no,” they may 
align themselves with extremist groups more prepared to take the 
hostile measures against the out-group that are ultimately necessary 
to abate the crisis (in their minds).30 The individual’s acceptance of 
this framework, the escalation of their willingness to take these 
hostile measures, and their progressive involvement in such activities 
can generally be understood as the process of radicalization.31 
 
 26 Davey & Ebner, supra note 22, at 19-21. 
 27 Id. at 10. 
 28 Id. (emphasis added) (citing J.M. Berger, EXTREMISM (2018)); but see 
Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Canada, the U.K. and the 
U.S., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (July 28-30, 2015), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf (other researchers have observed that it is 
possible to engage in extremist violence without adopting an extremist belief 
system, which may be the case, for example, when individuals join violent extremist 
groups primarily because members of their pre-existing social groups are involved 
in them). 
 29 J.M. BERGER, EXTREMISM 124-27 (MIT Press 2018). 
 30 Id. at 126. 
 31 Id. at 117-27. 
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Alt-right communities have utilized a variety of online 
platforms to disseminate white supremacist propaganda which 
contributes to the radicalization of some of their supporters. 
Researchers monitoring the r/altright subreddit from July 2016 to 
January 2017, for example, concluded that the popular Reddit sub-
forum “presented clear signs of known warning behaviors of violent 
extremism, particularly fixation [with race and racial degradation] and 
[in-group/out-]group identification.”32 This was evidenced by 
analyzing the frequency with which racial terms were used by posters 
and the level of anger apparent from those posts.33 The most popular 
racial terms used were terms “associated with white identity or the 
development of an ethnostate.”34 The researchers found that 
“increasing fixation . . . on race and racial concepts and an increasing 
anger in comments that mentioned these racial terms” was 
measurable over time.35 
Another group of researchers analyzing 331,849 YouTube 
videos on 360 channels associated with the alt-right discovered that a 
steady migration of users from milder to more extreme alt-right 
channels could be shown by cross-referencing the videos’ 79 million 
combined comments.36 Many users who commented on milder alt-
right videos (i.e., alt-light videos) were found to have commented on 
more extreme alt-right videos at later dates.37 The study’s authors 
argue these findings may demonstrate a pathway of radicalization for 
the alt-right also exists on YouTube.38 They speculate that the 
website’s algorithm for recommending channels based on similar 
content could be responsible for this pathway as the milder and more 
 
 32 Ted Grover & Gloria Mark, Detecting Potential Warning Behaviors of 
Ideological Radicalization in an Alt-Right Subreddit, 193 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
THIRTEENTH INTERNATIONAL AAAI CONFERENCE ON WEB AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
193, 202-03 (2019), https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/
3221/3089. 
 33 Id. at 199-203. 
 34 Id. at 199. 
 35 Id. at 202. 
 36 Manoel Horta Ribeiro et. al., Auditing Radicalization Pathways on YouTube, 
CORNELL: COMPUTERS & SOC’Y (Sept. 3, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1908.08313.pdf. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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extreme alt-right channels were often linked through a successive 
series of such automated recommendations.39 
Researchers looking specifically at anti-Semitism among alt-
right communities on 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (“/pol/”) 
and the right-wing Twitter spinoff Gab demonstrated these sort of 
fringe websites are propaganda factories for the alt-right which 
support such pathways of radicalization. In analyzing 160 million 
memes from over 2.6 billion posts on /pol/, Gab, Twitter, and 
Reddit, the researchers found that the /pol/ board was surprisingly 
effective in originating certain anti-Semitic memes that were later 
shared widely on the mainstream sites, Twitter and Reddit.40 Anti-
Semitic memes originating on the mainstream sites did not become as 
popular on the fringe websites.41 According to the researchers, this 
finding “suggest[s] that /pol/ acts as a primary reservoir to incubate 
and transmit [hate] to downstream Web communities.”42 Researchers 
speculate that the resulting success of the memes originating from 
/pol/ could be due to the fact they often consist of anti-Semitic 
variants on popular mainstream memes, making “antisemitism more 
accessible and common” to users.43 
Another study specifically analyzing memes designed to 
promote the Great Replacement Theory shows those memes might 
be successful for additional reasons. Researchers reviewed a 
collection of 480 of such memes on various websites and found that 
“90% (431) of [those] pieces of content contained generalised 
dehumanising and racist discussion playing on racial stereotypes, 
themes of racial impurity, the threat of cultural differences between 
Europeans and people from Africa and the Middle East, and anti-
Semitic conspiracy theories.”44 They argue this finding “demonstrates 
how material shared around this topic rarely engages with the ideas 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Joel Finkelstein et. al, A Quantitative Approach to Understanding Online 
Antisemitism, CORNELL: COMPUTERS & SOC’Y 1, 10 (Sept. 5, 2018), https://
arxiv.org/pdf/1809.01644.pdf. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Davey & Ebner, supra note 22, at 23. 
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underlying the Great Replacement theory, but instead simply appeals 
to emotion and pre-existing prejudices.” This comports with the 
general understanding among experts on terrorism that there are 
many factors, such as pre-existing biases, which might predispose an 
individual to radicalization including but not limited to their mental 
health, social circles, and criminal history.45 
Researcher Luke Munn argues that while the process of 
online radicalization is unique for each alt-right violent extremist, 
there are three main “cognitive phases” many experience.46 The first 
is normalization, during which humor and irony is critical.47 Harsh 
white supremacist ideas are “repackaged in the visual vernacular of 
the Web: animated GIFs, dumb memes, and clever references.”48 The 
purpose of this content is to “trivialize and thus normalize racism 
and xenophobia.”49 Because they take the form of jokes, their 
consumer feels more comfortable sharing these ideas because they 
can later disclaim them as such.50 Each further exposure to these 
ideas shocks the consumer less and prepares them for the second 
stage: acclimation.51 This is the phase we typically think of as “online 
radicalization,” where the consumer “becomes successively 
conditioned” to a series of increasingly extremist environments.52 For 
instance, if they are actively participating in a mainstream alt-right 
community such as the r/altright subreddit, they might start 
participating in a more fringe one, like 4chan’s or 8chan’s /pol/ 
board. Each progression “establishes a new cognitive baseline for 
what is acceptable,” desensitizing the consumer further and further.53 
The final phase is dehumanization. This is the point when consumer 
 
 45 Allison Smith, Risk Factors and Indicators Associated With Radicalization to 
Terrorism in the United States, NAT’L INST. JUST. 1, 14 (June 2018), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251789.pdf. 
 46 Luke Munn, Alt-right pipeline: Individual journeys to extremism online, 24 FIRST 
MONDAY 6 (June 2019), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/
10108/7920. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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has become so desensitized to racism and xenophobia that they no 
longer even acknowledge the individuality or humanity of those they 
hate, referring to them simply as part of a faceless army of “invaders” 
or “enemies.”54 This cognitive phase is often a prerequisite to 
violence, Munn notes, because not acknowledging the other’s 
humanity “shifts the enemy out of the category of ethical 
consideration altogether” and therefore leaves little justification to 
oppose their mistreatment.55 
C. Specific Examples: London, El Paso, and Christchurch 
Relatively little is publicly known about the alt-right 
extremists who committed the acts of domestic terrorism in 
Christchurch and El Paso discussed in Part I. However, what we do 
know about their experiences suggests they were radicalized via the 
ideology and process outlined here. Each apparently believed their 
attacks were part of a semi-concerted last-ditch effort to save the 
white race from an ongoing “genocide” brought about by 
surreptitious multicultural forces. 
These recent attacks took place in the context of a post-
Breivik landscape. Breivik’s devastating attack in Norway in 2011 
“targeted a youth summer camp attended by the children of liberal 
Norwegian politicians as ‘revenge’ for the Norwegian government’s 
embrace of Muslim immigrants,” which he viewed as destroying 
European culture.56 It was the deadliest lone-wolf terrorist attack in 
the continent’s history.57At his first public court hearing, Breivik 
attempted to give a speech where he described himself as the 
“Commander” of a “resistance movement” fighting against 
multiculturalism in Europe.58 This “Commander” moniker was 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Munn, supra note 47. 
 56 Clarke, supra note 17. 
 57 Asne Seierstad, Does mass murderer Anders Breivik still pose a threat to the 
security of Europe?, IRISH EXAMINER (May 7, 2016), https://www.irishexaminer.com
/viewpoints/analysis/the-long-read-does-mass-murderer-anders-breivik-still-pose-
a-threat-to-the-security-of-europe-398049.html. 
 58 Anders Behring Breivik in ‘commander’ boast, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 
2011, 7:24 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/14/anders-
behring-breivik-norway-court. 
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embraced by Breivik’s many online followers, who also hailed him as 
a hero, saint, and martyr.59 He became a living symbol to rally the 
many “individuals and groups that fall under the broad tent of neo-
Nazi ideology and white supremacy, particularly those that advocate 
for the use of violence against perceived adversaries: immigrants, 
Muslims, Jews, and any politicians deemed to have liberal leanings or 
who embrace multiculturalism or tolerance of other races, religions, 
and sects.”60 When asked about Breivik years later, prolific Internet 
troll and influential white supremacist Andrew “Weev” Auernheimer 
remarked: “We all love and support him unconditionally.”61 Memes 
featuring Breivik are still shared in alt-right circles today. 
Years after Breivik’s attacks, in 2017, a British man named 
Darren Osborne rented a utility van for the express purpose of 
driving it into a group of Muslims participating in a planned march 
near a mosque in Finsbury Park, North London. He succeeded in 
injuring eleven and killing one.62 After plowing into the group of 
worshippers, Osborne exited the van and yelled “I want to kill all 
Muslims!” before he was wrestled to the ground by others.63 He was 
detained by authorities at the scene shortly thereafter.64 
Osborne, who was described by acquaintances as a “loner,” 
had become radicalized in a matter of mere weeks.65 His introduction 
to the extreme right was Three Girls,66 a BBC docu-drama series about 
 
 59 Clarke, supra note 17. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Asne Seierstad, Is Norwegian Mass Murderer Anders Breivik Still a Threat to 
Europe?, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 13, 2016, 6:52 AM), https://www.newsweek.com
/anders-breivik-neo-nazi-suing-norway-asne-seierstad-447247. 
 62 Vikram Dodd & Matthew Taylor, London attack: ‘Aggressive’ and ‘strange’ 
suspect vowed to ‘do some damage’, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2017, 2:44 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/19/several-casualties-reported-
after-van-hits-pedestrians-in-north-london. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Lizzie Dearden, Darren Osborne: How Finsbury Park terror attacker became 
‘obsessed’ with Muslims in less than a month, THE INDEP. (Feb. 2, 2018, 12:27 AM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/darren-osborne-finsbury-park-
attack-who-is-tommy-robinson-muslim-internet-britain-first-a8190316.html. 
 66 Id. 
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the Rochdale grooming scandal: a massive child sex-abuse ring 
orchestrated by Muslim men. The series was strongly criticized as 
reinforcing already wide-spread Islamophobia in Britain.67 Osborne 
became “‘obsessed’ with Muslims” after watching the series and 
began to “binge” on Twitter posts by Britain First, a domestic hate 
group.68 He also sought out anti-Muslim articles and YouTube videos 
online,69 some of which were from the United States.70 While 
Osborne did not cite any prior attacks as an inspiration for his, it 
closely followed the assassination of British Labour Party Member of 
Parliament Jo Cox in 2016 by Thomas Mair, a right-wing extremist, 
as well as the banning of three extreme right-wing groups that same 
year.71 It was later revealed that Osborne chose the Finsbury Park 
mosque for his attack not only because he knew many Muslims 
would be attending the march there that night, but because he 
“believed that the leader of the Labour Party was due to attend and 
the Mayor of London may also [be] there.”72 
Two years after Osborne’s attack, Tarrant, the Christchurch 
attacker, thanked several alt-right lone-wolf terrorists – including 
Osborne and Breivik – for inspiring him to “take a stand against 
ethnic and cultural genocide.”73 He explained: “[f]rom where did [I] 
receive/research/develop [my] beliefs? The internet, of course. You 
 
 67 Waqas Tufail, Rotherham, Rochdale, and the Racialised Threat of the ‘Muslim 
Grooming Gang’, INTERNATIONAL J. CRIME, JUST. & SOC. DEMOCRACY 30 (2015), 
https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v4i3.249; Dodd & Taylor, supra note 63. 
 68 Vikram Dodd & Kevin Rawlinson, Finsbury Park attack: man ‘brainwashed 
by anti-Muslim propaganda’ convicted, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2018, 2:48 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/01/finsbury-park-van-attacker-
darren-osborne-found-guilty-murder-makram-ali; R. v. Osborne [2008] Woolwich 
Crown Court [7] (Eng.) (sentencing remarks of Cheema-Grubb J), https://
www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/r-v-osborne-sentencing-
remarks.pdf. 
 69 Tristan Kirk, Darren Osborne guilty: Anti-Muslim rhetoric from far-right leaders 
played ‘major role’ in radicalisation of Finsbury Park attacker, police say, EVENING 
STANDARD (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime
/darren-osborne-guilty-antimuslim-rhetoric-from-farright-leaders-played-major-
role-in-radicalisation-a3755991.html. 
 70 R. v. Osborne [2008] Woolwich Crown Court [7] (Eng.). 
 71 Dodd & Rawlinson, supra note 69. 
 72 R. v. Osborne [2008] Woolwich Crown Court [7] (Eng.). 
 73 Tarrant, supra note 1, at 18. 
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will not find the truth anywhere else.”74 Tarrant claimed that he 
acquired his beliefs over “a great deal of time, from a great deal of 
places” online and emphasized that they were not at all influenced by 
the outside world.75 
Signs that Tarrant was radicalized by the alt-right online were 
abundant throughout the events immediately leading up to his attack 
too. He announced the attack on 8chan’s /pol/ board roughly ten to 
twenty minutes before it began, writing: “Well lads, it’s time to stop 
[****] posting and time to make a real life effort post. I will carry out 
and [sic] attack against the invaders, and will even live stream the 
attack via [F]acebook.” Minutes later, he posted the promised link to 
his livestream with the title “‘Screw Your Optics,’ a reference to the 
words posted on Gab by a far-right Pittsburgh gunman before he 
killed [eleven] people at a synagogue in October 2018.”76 In the 
livestreamed video, Tarrant is initially seen in his car driving to the 
scene of his first attack.77 Before exiting the car, he says, “Remember 
lads, subscribe to PewDiePie,”78 a reference to a popular YouTube 
personality from Sweden who has been widely criticized for making 
racist comments and “flirting with alt-right culture.”79 In a section of 
his manifesto entitled “Emotions rule over facts,” Tarrant ominously 
states: “Memes have done more for the ethnonationalist movement 
than any manifesto.”80 He goes on to credit memes five more times 
in the document.81 
Crusius, the El Paso attacker, publicly acknowledged his 
agreement with Tarrant’s views in his own manifesto posted to 
 
 74 Id. at 17. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Tess Owen, Decoding the racist memes the alleged New Zealand shooter used to 
communicate, VICE NEWS (Mar. 15, 2019, 5:46 PM), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/vbwn9a/decoding-the-racist-memes-the-new-zealand-shooter-used-
to-communicate/. 
 77 Macklin, supra note 3. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Aja Romano, YouTube’s most popular user amplified anti-Semitic rhetoric. 
Again., VOX (Dec. 13, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/
13/18136253/pewdiepie-vs-tseries-links-to-white-supremacist-alt-right-redpill. 
 80 Tarrant, supra note 1, at 47. 
 81 Id. at 45, 47. 
2020 The Globalization of Hate 9:1 
147 
8chan. It contained much of the same rhetoric of the Great 
Replacement Theory.82 Like Tarrant, Crusius also “told investigators 
that he came to his views by doing research online.”83 A cursory 
review of his social media accounts before they were taken down 
revealed that he “liked tweets that had the #BuildtheWall hashtag as 
well as a photo using guns to spell out ‘Trump,’ and posts from Paul 
Joseph Watson, a far-right Youtuber who works with Alex Jones at 
InfoWars.”84 Not much else is known about Crusius’ online presence 
before the attack, but his use of 8chan to disseminate a manifesto – 
the third use of 8chan by an alt-right terrorist for that purpose that 
year85 – suggests that he was aware it was a hotspot for alt-right 
activity and probably posted there prior. The manifesto generally 
reads as though it is addressed to the alt-right too. For example, 
Crusius warns any readers considering taking actions similar to his 
not to “attack heavily guarded areas to fulfill your super soldier [Call 
of Duty] fantasy.”86 This statement is somewhat telling. Followers of 
the alt-right observe that online communities where they tend to 
congregate like Reddit, 4chan/8chan, and Discord have significant 
populations of (video) gamers and that many individuals involved in 
the alt-right are themselves gamers.87  
D. Scope of the Issue 
White supremacist attackers were responsible for seventy-
eight percent of the eighty-three extremist killings in the United 
States in 2018.88 This was a significant increase over the thirty-seven 
 
 82 Politi, supra note 12; El Paso Shooter’s manifesto, supra note 12. 
 83 Erin Ailworth et. al., Lost in Life, El Paso Suspect Found a Dark World 
Online, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2019, 8:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/lost-in-life-el-paso-suspect-found-a-dark-world-online-11565308783. 
 84 Politi, supra note 12. 
 85 Gianluca Mezzofiore & Donie O’Sullivan, El Paso mass shooting is at least 
the third atrocity linked to 8chan this year, CNN (Aug. 5, 2019, 7:43 AM), https://
www.cnn.com/2019/08/04/business/el-paso-shooting-8chan-biz/index.html. 
 86 El Paso Shooter’s manifesto, supra note 12. 
 87 See generally All Things Considered: Right-Wing Hate Groups Are Recruiting 
Video Gamers, NPR (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/05/
660642531/right-wing-hate-groups-are-recruiting-video-gamers. 
 88 Report: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018, ADL CENTER ON 
EXTREMISM 1, 4 (Jan. 2019), https://www.adl.org/media/12480/download. 
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extremist-related murders documented in 2017.89 In England and 
Wales, hate crimes related to race have increased by 123% since 
2013.90 “Between April 2017 and March 2018, the U.K. government 
[also] noted an increase of [thirty-six] percent of the number of 
people referred to the government’s counter-extremism program for 
far-right activities.”91 The attacks in London, Christchurch, and El 
Paso discussed here may just be small contributions to this 
international surge of race-based violence, or they might collectively 
be driving it. The process of self-radicalization reinforced by the alt-
right as well as its decentralized nature makes it challenging to 
determine how many attacks that specific community has encouraged 
or enabled. There is no comprehensive data on this in the U.S. or 
elsewhere. 
The features of the alt-right movement engender legal issues 
in terms of: (1) whether acts of domestic terror inspired by its 
ideologies are prosecuted as acts of terror or something less culpable, 
and (2) who besides their perpetrators could be criminally liable in 
connection with those attacks and for what crimes. Each of these 
issues is addressed in kind below. 
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM LAWS 
How lone-wolf, alt-right violent extremists are radicalized is 
relevant to an analysis of why domestic terrorism laws do or do not 
apply to their attacks in a particular jurisdiction. The factual 
circumstances surrounding these attacks also generally inform 
whether other individuals associated with the perpetrators are 
potentially criminally liable for the attacks. The domestic laws 
applicable to the El Paso, London, and Christchurch attacks 
mentioned above are surveyed in detail below. A comparison of the 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Matthew Weaver, Hate crime surge linked to Brexit and 2017 terrorist attacks, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2018, 5:52 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/
2018/oct/16/hate-crime-brexit-terrorist-attacks-england-wales. 
 91 United Kingdom: Extremism & Counter-Extremism, COUNTER EXTREMISM 
PROJECT (2019), https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/united-kingdom 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
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relevant advantages and disadvantages of each legal regime in such 
contexts is the focus of discussion here. 
A.  United States 
Federal criminal laws in the United States strictly differentiate 
domestic terrorism from international terrorism. The term “domestic 
terrorism” first entered the statutory lexicon in 2001 following the 
passage of the Patriot Act, a response to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center intended to provide the United 
States with more comprehensive legal tools to fight terrorism.92 
According to the Act: 
[T]he term “domestic terrorism” means activities 
that— (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that 
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . 93 
“International terrorism” is defined similarly and includes not only 
acts dangerous to human life that are violations of criminal laws in 
the United States, but those that “would be a criminal violation if 
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any 
State.”94 The primary difference between these definitions is that such 
acts are only international terrorism when they “occur primarily 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend 
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or 
 
 92 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, 
107 P.L. 56, 115 Stat. 272 (LEXIS 2019). 
 93 18 U.S.C.S. § 2331(5) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-65). 
 94 § 2331(1)(A) (LEXIS 2019) (emphasis added). 
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coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum.”95 
Nevertheless, while domestic terrorism is defined under 
federal law, it is not actually criminalized therein.96 Only a “federal 
crime of terrorism” is listed.97 That crime applies to offenses that are 
“calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct” 
in the course of committing one or more of the many crimes 
enumerated in the statutes.98 These enumerated crimes fall into three 
categories: (1) “offenses committed with particular weapons – such 
as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons or more common 
explosives – and [with] tactics historically associated with terrorism, 
such as taking hostages or hijacking aircraft;” (2) offenses concerning 
“targets of . . . violence where there is a distinct federal interest, such 
as violence against federal officials, federal facilities, and mass transit 
or communications systems;” and (3) crimes against persons and 
property that have an “international nexus” in that they involve 
 
 95 § 2331(1)(C) (LEXIS 2019) (emphasis added). 
 96 See Katie Dilts, One of These Things is Not Like the Other: Federal Law’s 
Inconsistent Treatment of Domestic and International Terrorism, 50 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
711 (2019). 
 97 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b (LEXIS 2019); see also id. § 2332 (similarly 
criminalizing homicides, attempted homicides, and conspiracies to commit 
homicide with transnational aspects to them). 
 98 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b(g)(5) (LEXIS 2019); but see Shirin Sinnar, Separate 
And Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” And “International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 
1333, 1352-1353 (2019) (arguing the third category “converts violent acts – as well 
as threats, attempts, and conspiracies to commit such acts – into federal crimes 
where there is an international link, irrespective of political intent”). There seems to 
be some confusion about this. The federal crime of terrorism, which requires a 
political motivation, is defined under § 2332b(g)(5) and refers back to § 2332b as a 
whole (“Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries”) as an enumerated 
crime that constitutes the federal crime of terrorism if undertaken with such a 
political motivation. Section 2332b(a) outlines an “offense” that does not require 
that a violent act have a political motivation, only that it involve conduct occurring 
both inside and outside of the United States. Section 2332b(a) can thus be read as a 
separate crime of “terrorism transcending national boundaries” vis-à-vis the federal 
crime of terrorism under § 2332b(g)(5) notwithstanding the recursive nature of that 
latter definition. While Sinnar’s alternate reading of § 2332b(g)(5) is fair, it does not 
significantly change the analysis presented here. 
2020 The Globalization of Hate 9:1 
151 
conduct occurring both inside and outside of the United States – 
including threats, attempts, and conspiracies to commit such crimes.99 
In addition to the federal crime of terrorism itself, the statutes 
provide that any other felony that “involved, or was intended to 
promote, [the] federal crime of terrorism” is eligible for a terrorism 
sentencing enhancement.100 
For example, under the first category of enumerated crimes, 
the arson or bombing of any property used in interstate or foreign 
commerce – such as an airplane travelling across international 
borders – can constitute the federal crime of terrorism if done for the 
purpose of intimidating or coercing the U.S. government.101 Under 
the second category, abducting or killing a member of Congress for 
similar purposes constitutes the federal crime of terrorism.102 
Generally, methods of international terrorists are accounted for while 
the favorite of domestic lone-wolf terrorists in the U.S. – mass 
shootings – is absent in the federal terrorism statutes. 
What stands out about the federal crime of terrorism, beyond 
its focus on traditional methods of international terrorism, is that it 
does not criminalize acts that seek to coerce or intimidate a civilian 
population, only those which also seek to coerce or intimidate the U.S. 
government itself.103 While the scope of the federal definition of 
“domestic terrorism” acknowledges that such attacks may be 
ideologically motivated, the federal crime of terrorism only focuses on 
 
 99 Sinnar, supra note 100, at 1352-53 (2019); 18 U.S.C.S. § § 2331- 2339D 
(LEXIS 2019). 
 100 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 3A1.4 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-65); see also 
Unite States v. Graham, 275 F.3d. 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001) (“the defendant need not 
have been convicted of a federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
2332b(g)(5) for the district court to find that he intended his substantive offense of 
conviction or his relevant conduct to promote such a terrorism crime” under the 
sentencing enhancement guidelines). 
 101 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b(g)(1); §2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); 18 U.S.C.S. § 844(i) 
(LEXIS 2019). 
 102 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b(g)(1); § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); 18 U.S.C.S. § 351(a) 
(LEXIS 2019). 
 103 See United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2014); see also United 
States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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those that are politically motivated.104 This discrepancy has significant 
implications in the context of terrorism committed by the alt-right, 
which is often motivated by vehemently racist, white supremacist 
ideologies that are otherwise not overtly “political” in the sense that 
they directly oppose governmental affairs.105 
Of course, acts of domestic terrorism can also violate state 
laws. Virginia’s criminal code quite broadly defines the offense of 
“domestic terrorism” as “engaging in or taking a substantial step to 
commit a violation of the criminal laws of [Virginia] with the intent 
to: (A) cause death or serious bodily injury to multiple persons; or (B) 
threaten any civilian population with mass destruction, mass killings, 
or kidnapping.”106 New York’s statute criminalizing domestic 
terrorism mirrors the language of the federal definition of “domestic 
terrorism,” providing that: 
[One] is guilty of a crime of terrorism when, with 
intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, 
influence[s] the policy of a unit of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or affect[s] the conduct of a 
unit of government by murder, assassination or 
kidnapping, he or she commits a specified offense.107 
These state laws are seemingly rarely invoked compared to federal 
terrorism laws though. 
Texas currently has no domestic terrorism statute on its 
books. Under Virginia’s or New York’s statute, Crusius, the El Paso 
shooter, would undoubtedly be criminally liable though. Both statutes 
criminalize killings that threaten or intimidate a civilian population. 
The general tenor of Crusius’ manifesto was that Mexicans are 
invading America and need to be taught a violent lesson. “This attack 
 
 104 22 U.S.C.S § 2656f(d)(2) (LEXIS 2019) (“the term ‘terrorism’ means 
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”). 
 105 Political, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE (last visited Nov. 9, 
2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/political. 
 106 13 V.S.A. Section 1703(a)(1) (LEXIS 2019). 
 107 N.Y. C.L.S. Penal § 490.25(1) (LEXIS 2019). 
2020 The Globalization of Hate 9:1 
153 
is a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas. They are the 
instigators, not me,” he explains.108 From such statements, one can 
certainly infer that the purpose of Crusius’ attack, which specifically 
targeted “Mexicans,” was to threaten or intimidate that population 
generally – especially considering Crusius made his manifesto public 
and committed his attack in a very public place: Walmart. According 
to New York state courts, the phrase “intending to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population” implies, at minimum, “an intention to create a 
pervasively terrorizing effect on people living in a given area, directed 
either to all residents of the area or to all residents of the area who 
are members of some broadly defined class, such as a gender, race, 
nationality, ethnicity, or religion.”109 The El Paso shooting 
demonstrably had such a “terrorizing effect” on the Latinx, and 
especially Mexican-American, communities in Texas and many others 
around the U.S..110 
Since no state or federal crime of domestic terrorism was 
available, Crusius was charged with capital murder, Texas’ most 
serious crime.111 Early on, news media reported that he may also be 
charged with federal hate crimes, but the viability of such charges has 
been seriously questioned on the grounds that federal hate crimes 
only encompass activities that cross state lines, which does not seem 
to be the case with the El Paso shooting.112 Crusius cannot be 
 
 108 El Paso Shooter’s Manifesto, supra note 12. 
 109 People v. Morales, 2011 NY Slip Op 4537, ¶¶ 8-9, 86 A.D.3d 147, 157, 
924 N.Y.S.2d 62, 68 (App. Div.), reversed in part on other grounds, 2012 NY Slip Op 
8439, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 958 N.Y.S.2d 660, 982 N.E.2d 580 (agreeing that defendant 
killing two people to intimidate a rival gang did not rise to the level of intimidating 
or coercing a civilian population under New York’s domestic terrorism statute). 
 110 See Dianna M. Náñez et. al., ‘It’s real. It’s violent’: After El Paso, Latinos 
across America live in fear, USA TODAY (Aug. 16, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/08/16/el-paso-texas-mass-shooting-
latino-hispanic-reaction/2027932001/. 
 111 Mark Berman & Robert Moore, El Paso shooting suspect indicted by grand 




 112 Thomas T. Cullen, The Grave Threats of White Supremacy and Far-Right 
Extremism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/
opinion/christopher-hasson-extremism.html. 
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charged with the federal crime of terrorism for similar reasons. That crime 
requires “conduct transcending national boundaries” unless weapons 
or tactics historically associated with terrorism are involved or a 
distinctly federal interest is implicated.113 Although Crusius’ attack 
involved “conduct transcending national boundaries” in a very loose 
sense in that his attack killed eight Mexican nationals, prompting 
Mexico’s Foreign Minister to threaten legal action against the United 
States,114 it did not involve “conduct occurring outside of the United 
States in addition to the conduct occurring in the United States,” 
which is how that phrase is defined in the statute outlining the federal 
crime of terrorism.115 
Although Crisus’ attack meets the federal definition of 
“international terrorism” in that the conduct involved appears to 
“transcend national boundaries in terms of . . . the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or coerce,”116 no federal crime of 
international terrorism exists either.117 “International terrorism” is 
similarly only defined in reference to other crimes under the 
terrorism statutes and does not constitute a separate offense.118 
Therefore, all terrorism falls under the purview of the federal crime 
of terrorism under federal criminal law. 
In federal court, a conviction for capital murder can be 
subject to the terrorism sentencing enhancement. The enhancement 
applies to felonies that “promote” terrorism in that they “help bring 
about, encourage, or contribute to a federal crime of terrorism.”119 
However, in such circumstances, the actor must still commit the 
 
 113 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b(a)(1) (LEXIS 2019). 
 114 David K. Li, Mexico vows to take legal action against U.S. after El Paso 
massacre, NBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019, 3:19 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/
us-news/mexico-vows-take-legal-action-against-u-s-wake-deadly-n1039096. 
 115 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b(g)(1) (LEXIS 2019). 
 116 18 U.S.C.S. § 2331(1)(C) (LEXIS 2019). 
 117 See generally 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2331 — 2339D (LEXIS 2019). 
 118 Id. 
 119 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 3A1.4; Awan, 607 F.3d 306 at 309 (emphasis added); 
United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 1002 (7th Cir. 2005) (“the word ‘promote,’ as 
used in § 3A1.4, signifies that where a defendant’s offense or relevant conduct 
helps or encourages a federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
2332b(g)(5)(B), then § 3A1.4 is triggered”). 
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underlying felony with the additional specific intent to “influence or 
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to 
retaliate against government conduct” as the federal crime of 
terrorism requires.120 Although Crusius’ attack was arguably more 
racially motivated than politically motivated, some of his statements 
do suggest he saw himself as fighting back against the government. 
He argued that his actions were necessary because “Hispanics will 
take control of the local and state government of my beloved Texas, 
changing policy to better suit their needs. They will turn Texas into 
an instrument of a political coup which will hasten the destruction of 
our country.”121 Unlike the federal crime of terrorism, the sentencing 
enhancement does not require the conduct involved in the offense 
transcend national boundaries.122 As such, Crurius’ conviction could 
have been subject to the enhancement under this view if he was 
charged with capital murder in federal court rather than state court. 
Although Crucius cannot be charged with the federal crime 
of terrorism or subjected to the sentencing enhancement, it is worth 
asking if anyone associated with his attacks could be held liable if he 
had been so charged in federal court. Congress has criminalized a 
wide variety of activities associated with terrorism, such as providing 
 
 120 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 138 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Elshinawy, No. ELH-16-009, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51362, at *11-12 (D. Md. Mar. 
28, 2018) (“As to the phrase ‘calculated to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct’ in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A), the ‘standard’ for the enhancement focuses 
on the offense, asking ‘whether it was calculated, i.e., planned—for whatever 
reason or motive—to achieve the stated object.’”). 
 121 El Paso Shooter’s Manifesto, supra note 12. 
 122 United States v. Garey, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2005), habeas 
corpus dismissed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53286 (E.D. Ky. July 18, 2006), habeas corpus 
denied, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81898 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 16, 2006), remanded, 483 F.3d 
1159, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 480 (11th Cir. 2007), habeas corpus denied, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 33510 (E.D. Ky. May 7, 2007), affirmed, 546 F.3d 1359, 21 Fla. L. 
Weekly Fed. C 1223 (11th Cir. 2008) (defendant’s conduct involved a federal crime 
of terrorism since it was intended to affect the conduct of government and 
involved weapons of mass destruction; furthermore, conduct transcending national 
boundaries was not required for the enhancement, even though it was required for 
the substantive offense); cf. United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(agreeing the sentencing enhancement does not require transnational conduct, but 
concluding the federal crime of terrorism does not either). 
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material support to terrorists and harboring or concealing terrorists. 
“Material support” is broadly defined as including “any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, 
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel . . . , and transportation.”123 
Two separate statutes prohibit providing material support to 
terrorists. The first criminalizes intentionally or knowingly providing 
material support – such as resources, expertise, or training – that 
facilitates past or future terrorist acts.124 Providing firearms to a 
terrorist organization would undoubtably constitute a violation 
because one can readily assume they will be used for violence 
furthering its terrorist objectives.125 In contrast, providing a group 
deemed to be a terrorist organization with training on how to report 
violations of its constituents’ human rights to the United Nations 
does not seemingly facilitate any acts of violence and therefore would 
not constitute a violation.126 The defendant’s awareness of the extent 
to which the materials they provided would support terrorism is the 
critical inquiry.127 
For this reason, most material support cases arise under the 
second statute,128 which criminalizes knowingly providing material 
 
 123 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A(b)(1) (LEXIS 2019). 
 124 § 2339A(a). 
 125 United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1019 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(quoting United States v. Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2006)). 
 126 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 127 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“[Under] section 2339A, a donor to terrorism, to be liable under section 2333, 
must have known that the money would be used in preparation for or in carrying 
out the killing or attempted killing of, conspiring to kill, or inflicting bodily injury 
on, an American citizen abroad.”). 
 128 Ronbert H. Schwartz, Laying the Foundation for Social Media Prosecutions 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1181 (2017) (“[§] 2339B is more 
applicable to most fact scenarios”); see also, e.g., United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 
127 (2d Cir. 2011) (providing martial arts lessons to terrorists); see also, e.g., Warsame, 
537 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (providing English lessons to terrorists). 
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support to a foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”).129 Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State is authorized 
to designate FTOs.130 These groups, which currently include 
Hizballah and Al-Qa’ida, must be (1) foreign organizations that (2) 
engage in terrorism or retain the ability to do so and (3) threaten the 
national security of the United States or its citizens.131 Under this 
statute, providing material support to such a group is a crime as long 
as the actor is aware the group is an FTO.132 Proving a violation is 
therefore much simpler than proving a defendant knew the particular 
resources, expertise, or training they provided would “be used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out” a specific terrorist act by that 
group.133 
The fact that most material support cases involve assistance 
to FTOs is problematic in the context of alt-right terrorism. The alt-
right largely consists of decentralized, anonymous online 
communities centered around white supremacist ideologies which are 
promulgated by memes and hate speech shared by users across the 
globe. It is therefore not a “foreign organization” in the sense that it 
has members, a hierarchical structure, and so forth – although many 
alt-right communities do include members of recognized domestic 
 
 129 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B(a)(1) (LEXIS 2019). 
 130 8 U.S.C.S. § 1189(a)(1); Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM (accessed Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-
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 131 8 U.S.C.S. § 1189(a)(1)(a); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 134; The 
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UNION (accessed Nov. 3, 2019), 
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_final.pdf; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 1, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 
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 132 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B(a)(1); United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 371 
(4th Cir. 2008) (“As we held [before,] the mere fact of designation, rather than the 
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stands accused of providing material support [under §2339B] . . . “); Warsame, 537 
F. Supp. 2d at 1019; Holder, 561 U.S. at 1. 
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and foreign hate groups.134 Although federal law defines a “terrorist 
organization” as merely “a group of two or more individuals, whether 
organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages 
in, [terrorist] activities,”135 seemingly encompassing diffuse online 
communities like the alt-right, “terrorism” itself is defined as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” An 
emphasis on organized state-sponsored groups is evident from the 
Secretary of State’s statutory mandate to investigate countries whose 
governments provide terrorists with political, diplomatic, monetary, 
or military support.136 
In the unlikely event the alt-right is designated as an FTO, 
companies that facilitate communications for the alt-right could be 
held accountable for providing material support to them under the 
second statute. Some commentators have argued that social media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter should at least be civilly liable 
under the statute because their services utilize algorithms that 
automatically connect users with FTOs, and therefore assist with 
their recruitment efforts, as well as provide efficient, low-cost 
platforms for spreading propaganda and fundraising.137 Through their 
failure to proactively moderate such content, companies like 
Facebook allow FTOs to exist on their platforms.138 Because these 
companies are aware that such FTOs are utilizing their services to 
further their terrorist objectives, the statute’s mens rea requirement 
that violators knowingly support terrorist groups is satisfied.139  
These statutes provide for accomplice liability and are 
inchoate offenses like attempt and conspiracy to the extent they 
 
 134 Spencer Sunshine, Will Decentralization of Neo-Nazism Spur More Right-
Wing Terrorism?, TRUTHOUT (Mar, 18, 2019), https://truthout.org/articles/will-
decentralization-of-neo-nazism-spur-more-right-wing-terrorism/. 
 135  8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(1)(vi)(III). 
 136 22 U.S.C.S. § 2656f (LEXIS 2019). 
 137 Schwartz, supra note 132, at 1208, 1214-16. 
 138 Schwartz, supra note 132, at 1208-17. 
 139 Schwartz, supra note 132, at 1208-17; see also Elizabeth M. Renieris, 
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ENT. & TECH. L. 673, 682-83 (2009). 
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criminalize supporting terrorism before it actually occurs.140 Federal 
terrorism statutes also explicitly criminalize threatening to commit 
terrorism or attempting or conspiring to do so.141 To be guilty of 
conspiracy in other contexts, one generally does not need to know 
the identity of their co-conspirators.142 Conspiracy only requires an 
agreement to commit a crime – a “meeting of the minds,” 
“understanding,” “shared criminal intent,” or “common purpose” 
depending on the jurisdiction – and an overt act by one of the 
conspirators in furtherance of its object.143 Because a conspirator is 
not liable for crimes that are not reasonably foreseen to be within the 
scope of the conspiracy,144 the existence and object of the conspiracy 
must be sufficiently apparent to them when making such an 
agreement.145 As one commentator notes, on the Internet, “abstract 
justifications of violence can combine with specific, personal 
information about possible targets of violence to generate a message 
that, viewed as a whole, is operational” as the object of a conspiracy 
under federal terrorism statutes.146 
Although racist discourse in popular alt-right communities 
like Reddit is demonstrably angry, it presumably does not escalate 
into specific calls to violent action. A new neo-Nazi social media 
platform called The Base is trying to change this by utilizing websites 
like Reddit as pathways of radicalization to “funnel committed 
extremists from around the internet into a group explicitly focused 
on providing users with terroristic skills, in order to produce real-
world violence.”147 These skills would consist of “lone wolf terror-
 
 140 Renieris, supra note 143, at 682. 
 141 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b(a)(2). 
 142 See e.g. Model Penal Code § 5.03(2) (LEXIS 2019). 
 143 Laurent Sacharoff, Conspiracy as Contract, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405, 
408-9 (2016); Model Penal Code § 5.03. 
 144 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
 145 Sacharoff, supra note 147, at 455-56; see generally Peter Margulies, The 
Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and the First Amendment, 2004 
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4 (2004). 
 146 Margulies, supra note 149. 
 147 Ben Makuch & Mack Lamoureux, Neo-Nazis Are Organizing Secretive 
Paramilitary Training Across America, VICE (Nov. 20 2018, 2:45 P.M.), https://
www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3mexp/neo-nazis-are-organizing-secretive-
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tactics” such as “gunsmithing, data mining, interrogation tactics, 
counter-surveillance techniques, bomb making, chemical weapons 
creation, and guerilla warfare”148 – which constitute “training” and 
“expert advice or assistance” within the meaning of the material 
support statute.149 Users of the website, which include many 
members of established hate groups, have been observed discussing 
how they “want to gather with people and plan something out,” like a 
bombing or “something a bit more destructive.”150 
While conspiracy liability would reach these alt-right terrorist 
“cells” like The Base, giving prosecutors an opportunity to 
incarcerate their participants before attacks occur, none of the lone-
wolf terrorists considered in this article coordinated their attacks with 
this level of assistance from such groups as far as we know, so the 
practical utility of this tool is questionable in the broader landscape of 
alt-right terrorism. 
B. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (“U.K.”) Parliament passed the 
Terrorism Act 2000 shortly before 9/11 to replace temporary 
legislation passed in the 1970s aimed at preventing and punishing 
terrorism stemming from the long-standing Northern Ireland 
Conflict.151 The Act greatly expanded the definition of “terrorism” 
under British criminal law and granted authorities a number of 
additional powers to quell terrorist threats.152 According to the Act, 
“‘terrorism’ means the use or threat of action where[:]” 
(a) the action [is one prohibited by the Act], (b) the 
use or threat is designed to influence the government 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339A(b) (“[T]he term ‘training’ means instruction or 
teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and 
. . . the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from 
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.”). 
 150 Makuch & Lamoureux, supra note 151. 
 151 Terrorism Act 2000, THE GUARDIAN: U.S. EDITION (Jan. 19, 2009, 6:23 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/19
/terrorism-act. 
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. . . or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious . . . or 
ideological cause.153 
Actions prohibited under the statute include conduct which: 
(a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) 
involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a 
person’s life . . . , (d) creates a serious risk to the 
health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or 
seriously to disrupt an electronic system.154 
The Act was amended in 2008 to additionally criminalize terrorist 
attacks for the purpose of advancing a “racial” cause.155 Unlike the 
U.S. Patriot Act, it applies equally to domestic and international 
terrorism.156  
The House of Commons passed a separate bill in 2008 which 
provided for a mandatory sentencing enhancement for serious crimes 
with a “terrorist connection.”157 Crimes that are eligible include, 
among many others, murder, kidnapping, causing an explosion likely 
to endanger life or property, and hijacking.158 Aiding, abetting, 
attempting, or conspiring to commit any of the enumerated offenses 
is also included in the bill.159 If such a terrorist connection is alleged, 
courts must consider evidence on that issue, rule on whether such a 
connection existed, and treat that fact as an aggravating factor if the 
court determines a connection did exist.160 The term “terrorist 
 
 153 Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 1(1) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/ukpga/2000/11/section/1. 
 154 Id. at §1(2). 
 155 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, c. 28, § 75(1) (UK), http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28/section/75. 
 156 Id. at §75(4)(a). 
 157 Counter-Terrorism Bill 2007-8, HL Bill [63] cl. 29-31 (UK), https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmbills/063/2008063.pdf. 
 158 Id. at sch. 2. 
 159 Id. 
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connection” is defined recursively to include any offense that “(a) is, 
or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or (b) is 
committed for the purposes of terrorism.”161 
Nevertheless, while “terrorism” is broadly defined under the 
Act, that definition only applies to several specific criminal offenses. 
These offenses include: (1) providing or receiving weapons training 
for the purpose of committing terrorism or encouraging another to 
do so, (2) directing a terrorist organization at any level, (3) possessing 
any items in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
such item will be used to commit terrorism, and (4) collecting any 
documents “of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism.”162 Despite this partitioning, the Crown 
Prosecution Service has made clear that crimes with only a “terrorist 
connection” are no less “terrorism” than any of the crimes defined 
under the Act, as that term is ordinarily understood.163 
Darren Osborne, the man who drove a van into a group of 
worshippers leaving a mosque in London in 2017, was charged and 
convicted of murder and attempted multiple murder.164 He was 
sentenced to life in prison for both crimes with a minimum of forty-
three years to be served as a result of the terrorism sentencing 
enhancement.165 The sentencing judge’s findings of fact outlined how 
Osborne was “rapidly radicalised over the internet” by an “extreme 
racist and anti-Islamic ideology.”166 She remarked, “Your plan was 
simple. To copy the method used by some Islamist terrorist and take 
a vehicle to a densely populated place and wreak as much devastation 
as possible as well as sowing long-lasting terror among the Muslim 
 
 161 Id. at cl. 84-5. 
 162 Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, §§ 54-58 (UK), http://www.
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population. . . . This was a terrorist attack. You intended to kill,” she 
concluded.167  
This case is a particularly instructive example of how 
supporters of the alt-right associated with such lone-wolf terrorists 
can escape criminal liability despite their involvement in the process 
of radicalization of such individuals. In the weeks leading up to his 
attack, Osborne followed the Twitter account of Britain First,168 an 
alt-right political party dedicated to opposing Islam and “mass 
immigration.”169 Prosecutor Jonathan Rees publicly confirmed that 
Osborne received several private messages from Jayda Fransen, the 
group’s former deputy leader during that timeframe – although the 
content of them has remained confidential.170 Osborne also received 
emails from Tommy Robinson, the former leader of the English 
Defence League (“EDL”), a far-right social group with aims similar 
to Britain First.171 One email discussed an EDL campaign regarding a 
woman who was raped by Middle Eastern men who were never 
prosecuted.172 The email read, “It’s a national outrage . . . I know you 
will be there for her and together, [sic] we’ll get her the justice she 
and her family have been denied.”173 A line from a Tweet posted by 
Robinson – “don’t look back in anger” – was also included in a note 
Osborne left at the scene of his attack.174 This evidence was 
presented to jurors at Osborne’s trial.175 Commander Dean Haydon 
of Scotland Yard’s Counter Terrorism Command commented that 
these messages likely played a significant part in Osborne’s 
radicalization.176 
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Both Britain First and the EDL have a long history of inciting 
hatred and violence in the U.K.. Thomas Mair, who is believed to 
have inspired Osborne’s attack, yelled “Britain first!” as he murdered 
Jo Cox, a pro-immigrant Member of Parliament, in 2016.177 Fransen 
and Britain First’s leader, Paul Golding, have been arrested on several 
occasions for harassing Muslims and were both convicted of hate 
speech-based crimes for such activities in 2018.178 Golding has been 
detained by police at least four times pursuant to a counter-terrorism 
provision of the Terrorism Act 2000.179 Reports indicate that Golding 
and Britain First members have been observed patrolling city streets 
in paramilitary uniforms and vehicles, training in unarmed combat, 
and attempting to instigate riots.180 One prominent member was 
quoted with saying the group was preparing for a “holy war.”181 
Robinson was similarly convicted of hate speech-based crimes in 
2011 for inciting a massive brawl between EDL members and 
football hooligans, 182 which the EDL actively recruits because of 
their known propensity for violence.183 That same year, EDL 
members ransacked a Muslim-owned bookstore where they 
reportedly “manhandled and abused” its patrons.184 Other members 
are reported to have physically attacked members of the British 
Socialist Workers’ Party, a far-left political group that actively 
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campaigns against the EDL, severely injuring one elderly man.185 
Several EDL members interviewed by academics studying the group 
also admitted to attacking racial minorities in random acts of violence 
not reported by news media.186 
The Terrorism Act 2000 does give the Secretary of State 
discretion to proscribe terrorist groups in a manner similar to the 
U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act. Groups proscribed must 
either: (a) commit or participate in acts of terrorism, (b) prepare for 
terrorism (c) promote or encourage terrorism, or (d) otherwise 
concern terrorism.187 An amendment by the Terrorism Act 2006 
clarifies that a group promotes or encourages terrorism if it glorifies – 
that is, praises or celebrates – terrorism in a way that persons exposed 
to their messages would be reasonably expected to infer that what is 
being glorified should be emulated.188 Persons who become members 
of such groups, provide tangible or intangible support to them, or 
publicly wear or disseminate images of articles of clothing arousing 
suspicion that they are a member or supporter of such groups can be 
imprisoned under the Act.189 The Terrorism Act of 2006 also 
separately criminalizes encouraging terrorism by intentionally or 
recklessly making statements that are likely to be understood by a 
reasonable person to either directly or indirectly induce the one 
exposed to them to commit, prepare, or instigate acts of terrorism.190 
These statutes go farther to prevent terrorism than the 
inchoate counter-terrorism offenses under the U.S. Patriot Act in that 
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they not only criminalize providing material support for terrorism or 
attempting or conspiring to do so, but they also criminalize words or 
actions that promote radicalization in the first instance. While the 
U.K maintains that such offenses are consistent with the 
government’s treaty obligations to prohibit “public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence” under the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism,191 critics have argued 
they are so overly broad that they intrude on the human right to 
freedom of expression.192 British case law does little to clarify where 
the line between glorifying terrorism and legitimate free expression is 
drawn, emphasizing only that whether that line has been crossed is a 
question of fact for the jury.193 
In one recent case, several defendants were convicted of 
supporting terrorism under Section 12 the Terrorism Act 2000 for 
organizing meetings where they made speeches concerning jihad.194 
The named defendant told attendees that the sun was setting on the 
British empire and rising on the Islamic State, that Muslims had an 
“obligation” to fulfill and should stop “procrastinating,” that those 
fighting “on the front line” in Tunisia and Kuwait were “the best of 
the best,” and that “victory” for Islam could soon be achieved.195 
Their convictions were upheld by the Court of the Appeals, which 
agreed that a jury could conclude such statements would reasonably 
be understood by attendees as encouraging them to take action to 
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support ISIS, a proscribed terrorist group – not simply adopt a 
similar opinion.196 
In another recent case, two defendants appealed their 
convictions for supporting a proscribed terrorist group under Section 
12 by challenging the definiteness of the term “support” in the 
statute.197 The defendants were “experienced speakers, perceived by 
others as leaders” who had a “large following on social media” where 
they often shared propaganda from ISIS.198 They also made several 
speeches “to emphasise the obligation on [sic] others to obey, or 
provide support to Al Baghdadi,” the leader of ISIS – which included 
the obligation to travel to the Islamic State.199 The defendants argued 
that because their speeches did not contain explicit invitations to 
commit violence, but merely invited generalized support for ISIS, 
they did not “encourage” terrorism in a way that constituted indirect 
support for it.200 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, 
concluding that providing “support” for terrorism, as that term is 
ordinarily understood, simply means engaging in any “conduct that 
strengthens, promotes or assists organisations which are concerned 
with terrorism.”201 This includes an individual providing “moral or 
intellectual support” for a proscribed group even if no one else is in 
fact induced by it.202 Such affirmation constitutes the actus reus of the 
offense while the defendant’s awareness of their conduct and the 
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proscribed status of the group constitutes its mens rea.203 The Court 
emphasized that this understanding of “supporting” terrorism is 
likewise consistent with the statutory construction of both Acts’ 
provisions which criminalize “encouraging” terrorism – although 
each provision addresses slightly different conduct.204 
Determining whether criminal liability could attach to 
Fransen or Robinson under these statutes in the context of 
Osborne’s attack is difficult since most convictions for supporting or 
encouraging terrorism in the U.K. involve proscribed groups. While 
many have called for Britain First and the EDL to be proscribed,205 
neither has been as of November 2019.206 Nevertheless, while 
proscription of a terrorist group is explicitly required to be found 
guilty of being a member, supporting, or displaying articles of such a 
group under the Terrorism Act 2000,207 it is not required to be found 
guilty of encouraging terrorist acts or disseminating terrorist 
publications under the Terrorism Act 2006.208 All that is required 
under the latter statute is that “terrorism” is intentionally or recklessly 
encouraged or assisted.209 This was made clear by amendments to 
both statutes in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 
2019, which explicitly made it an offense to express “an opinion or 
belief that is supportive of a proscribed organization” under the 2000 
Act and reworded the offense criminalizing encouraging terrorism 
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under the 2006 Act without adding any language regarding proscribed 
groups.210 
Osborne’s attack constituted terrorism under the Terrorism 
Act 2000 in that it endangered life and caused serious violence in 
order to “intimidate the public or a section of the public . . . for the 
purpose of advancing a . . . racial or ideological cause.”211 However, it 
is not clear if Britain First or the EDL encouraged the offense within 
the meaning of the Terrorism Act 2006. Both groups have been 
careful to distance themselves from such terror attacks. In response 
to Jo Cox’s murder, Golding ironically remarked that “he would like 
to see the person who carried it out ‘strung up by the neck on the 
nearest lamp post,’” thereby disavowing any involvement with the 
attacker on behalf of Britain First.212 Contrary to numerous reports 
detailing their members’ militant escapades, the EDL states on their 
website: “Our activities are peaceful. We are committed to non-
violence.”213 
Whether these groups appreciate that their ideology and violent 
activities would radicalize individuals like Osborne to commit 
terrorist attacks cuts to the heart of the issue of their potential 
culpability. Criminal liability for encouraging terrorism under the 
Terrorism Act 2006 again requires that the defendant engaged in 
conduct which directly or indirectly promoted terrorism either (1) 
intentionally or (2) recklessly. 214 This means the defendant must either 
(1) expect that terrorism will be promoted or (2) understand there is a 
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substantial and unreasonable risk it will be and consciously disregard 
that risk.215  
As articles like this and others demonstrate, there is plenty of 
circumstantial evidence that alt-right groups like Britain First and the 
EDL are aware their activities radicalize their followers given the 
prevalence of violent attacks committed by them. However, 
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that their leaders anticipated 
there was a substantial risk that an anonymous person like Osborne 
would be incited enough by their online hate speech to commit such 
an extreme act of violence is another story. Since whether these 
groups’ leaders possessed the requisite mens rea to be found guilty of 
encouraging terrorism is a question of fact for the jury, there is 
nothing stopping the Crown from bringing cases against such 
individuals and hoping for convictions. British prosecutors’ decisions 
to forgo such charges in light of the evidence presented here appears 
to be motivated by expediency, which is in stark contrast to the legal 
obstacles that U.S. prosecutors face under state and federal counter-
terrorism laws. 
C. New Zealand 
Like the U.S. Congress, the New Zealand Parliament 
reformed its counter-terrorism laws to respond to post-9/11 threats, 
but did so through a more succinct piece of legislation: The 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. It straightforwardly provides that 
one “commits an offence who engages in a terrorist act.”216 A 
“terrorist act” is defined as: 
An act . . . intended to cause, in any 1 or more 
countries, 1 or more of the outcomes specified in subsection 
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(3), and . . . carried out for the purpose of advancing 
an ideological, political, or religious cause, and with 
the following intention: (a) to induce terror in a 
civilian population; or (b) to unduly compel or to 
force a government or an international organisation 
to do or abstain from doing any act.217 
Qualifying outcomes under subsection (3) include: death; serious 
bodily injury; “a serious risk to the health or safety of a population;” 
and destruction of or serious damage to the economy, environment, 
or “property of great value or importance” (e.g., historical 
landmarks).218 Like the U.K.’s statutes, the Act applies equally to 
domestic and international terrorism and criminalizes a much wider 
array of conduct than the U.S. statutes. 
Tarrant was charged with committing a terrorist act, fifty 
counts of murder, and forty accounts of attempted murder shortly 
after the Christchurch shootings.219 This was reportedly the first time 
a terrorist charge had been levied under the Act.220 Tarrant’s trial is 
expected to begin on May 4, 2020 following his not guilty plea to all 
charges.221 
Similar to the U.S. and U.K. statutes, the Act provides a 
process by which the Prime Minister can designate terrorist groups so 
that the Crown can charge their members, recruiters, suppliers, and 
financiers with specific crimes under the Act.222 Designation of a 
group is only allowed if the Prime Minister has “good cause to 
suspect” the group has knowingly committed or participated in one or 
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more terrorist acts.223 As of October 2020, no white nationalist or 
affiliated groups have been so designated.224 
In his manifesto, Tarrant admitted that he donated to white 
nationalist groups and interacted with their members.225 This was 
confirmed by Tom Sewell, the president of the Lads Society, a 
prominent Australian white nationalist group.226 Sewell claimed that 
he reached out to Tarrant in an online community both frequented 
years earlier to ask him “to join a project to help create a ‘parallel 
society’ of only white people.”227 Tarrant declined, insinuating to 
Sewell that he “didn’t believe there was a peaceful solution to 
European people being genocided.”228 Sewell asserts that the Lads 
Society does not support violence “at this time,” but that “if you 
make the peaceful alternative impossible, you leave only the other 
option.”229 While there have been no reports that the group has 
committed acts of physical violence against others or glorified such 
actions publicly, their verbal harassment of people of color in 
Australia has been well-documented.230 
If the Lads Society had strongly encouraged Tarrant to 
commit the shootings, it is possible their members would be 
criminally liable for doing so, albeit not under the Terrorism 
Suppression Act. Unlike the U.K. statutes, encouraging acts of lone-
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wolf terrorism is not an offense under the Act.231 However, New 
Zealand’s criminal code does provide that “one is a party to and 
guilty of an offence who . . . incites, counsels, or procures any person 
to commit the offence.”232 Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“incitement” as “an instance of provoking, urging on, or stirring 
up.”233 Incitement is historically a common law inchoate offense 
which is not entirely premised on accomplice liability because “it is 
immaterial to the liability of the inciter that the crime that is 
instigated is not carried out” by the incitee.234 The offense of 
encouraging terrorism under the U.K.’s Terrorism Act 2006 is 
consistent with this common law understanding of incitement.235 As 
the U.K.’s Law Commission, who supported including such an 
offense, explained to Parliament, what makes an inciter’s actions 
culpable is their desire, hope, or belief that their incitement will result 
in the commission of the substantive offense, not whether the incitee 
intends on following through with it.236 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing review of the criminal laws applicable to 
terrorism in the U.S., U.K., and New Zealand and how they applied 
or could have applied in the context of the El Paso, London, and 
Christchurch attacks respectively, we can better understand why none 
of these laws are well-suited to address the rise of terrorism inspired 
by the alt-right. 
Most strikingly, despite the significant threat of domestic 
terrorism in the U.S. and U.K. compared to New Zealand, neither 
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country’s statutes definitively criminalize acts of “domestic terrorism” 
as New Zealand’s Terrorism Suppression Act does despite such acts 
falling under their definitions of “terrorism.” The federal crime of 
terrorism under U.S. law only punishes acts of terrorism to the extent 
that they involve criminal conduct occurring both inside and outside 
the U.S., which was not the case in El Paso. Similarly, the U.K’s 
Terrorism Act 2000 focuses on criminalizing participation in and 
support for proscribed organizations, yet none were involved in the 
London attack. While together the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
Terrorism Act 2006 include many other terrorism-related offenses 
concerning preparing for, coordinating, and encouraging terrorism, 
these are offenses designed to prevent terrorism, not prosecute its 
perpetrators as “terrorists” sui generis – which is what the public 
desires. Furthermore, because whether members or affiliates of a 
group engage in acts of “terrorism” is relevant for a determination of 
whether such a group should be designated as a “terrorist 
organization,” these statutes seem to engender a proverbial “chicken 
or the egg” dilemma. 
Fortunately, legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House 
of Representatives to close this loophole by including “acts of 
terrorism committed [wholly] within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States” under the existing federal crime of terrorism.237 The 
proposed addition encompasses violent attacks that intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population if they implicate interstate commerce or 
travel, distinctly federal interests, or matters exclusively within federal 
jurisdiction – such as the mail, government property, or territorial 
waters.238 More specifically, if a “facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce is used in furtherance of the offense,” the statute is 
triggered.239 The El Paso shooter did purchase the firearm he used to 
commit the attack online from a Texas-based dealer.240 The Internet 
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has been held to be a facility of interstate commerce in the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompasses Texas, as well as 
several other federal jurisdictions too.241 However, the statute also 
explicitly provides that the offense applies if “the defendant employs a 
firearm, dangerous weapon, weapon of mass destruction, or other 
weapon that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce,”242 which was 
not the case in El Paso and therefore would still not enable 
prosecutors to charge the shooter with it. It is currently unclear how 
these two provisions are to be reconciled – or if the House will even 
pass the amendment to the Patriot Act. 
Nevertheless, even where committing acts of domestic 
terrorism is prosecuted as such, as it is in New Zealand, centering 
complicity-based counter-terrorism offenses around participating in 
and supporting designated terrorist organizations has hindered 
counter-terrorism efforts aimed at the extreme right in the U.S.. 
White nationalist groups have actively been working to create a 
“leaderless resistance” since as early as the 1980s in response to such 
legal regimes.243 Their approach has been to construct a two-level 
movement: 
First, on an operational level, militant, underground, 
ideologically motivated cells or individuals (lone wolves) engage in 
movement-related illegal activity without any centralized direction or 
control from an organization that maintains traditional leadership 
positions and membership rosters. Second, on another level, the 
above-ground public face (the “political wing”) of the movement 
propagandizes and disseminates ideology—engaging in protected 
speech.244 
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With this dynamic, the public-facing group can disclaim any 
involvement with attacks committed by lone-wolves while still 
spreading the ideologies that radicalize them.245 This was 
demonstrably the case with the London attacker and most likely 
those in El Paso and Christchurch too.246 By continuing to rely on 
such a framework for criminalizing terrorist groups, such groups in 
the alt-right have continued to operate with relative impunity. 
Unlike the U.S.’s codes criminalizing material support for 
FTOs, which fails to extend liability to alt-right communities 
markedly because of this two-level approach, the crimes of 
encouraging terrorism in the U.K. and incitement in New Zealand 
can impose liability on participants in such communities only socially 
connected to lone-wolf terrorists online. Because these complicity-
based crimes depend on relationships between individuals, not their 
group affiliations, and are inchoate offenses to the extent they 
criminalize terrorism whether or not it actually occurs, they serve an 
extremely vital role in counter-terrorism efforts aimed at the alt-right. 
They must be committed intentionally or recklessly, which means that 
appreciating certain conduct entails a substantial risk – in this case, 
violence motivated by an ideology for the purpose of intimidating a 
civilian population (i.e., “terrorism”) – is presumably sufficient to 
meet the required mens rea for those crimes.247 The U.K statute is 
particularly broad, imposing liability for encouraging terrorism if any 
member of the public is directly or indirectly incited by their statements, 
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meaning the inciter need not even have a particular incitee in mind.248 
Liability can even extend to encouraging terroristic acts overseas which 
result in murder under both U.K. and New Zealand law.249 
While no directly equivalent offense exists under the U.S. 
Patriot Act, enacting one is not inconsistent with American law. 
Inciting someone to commit a crime of violence is already a crime 
under federal law.250 Despite broad protections for free speech in the 
U.S., the Supreme Court has consistently held that “fighting words” 
are not protected by the First Amendment.251 These are “statements 
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an 
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual 
or group of individuals.”252 Arizona and Virginia currently have 
statutes explicitly criminalizing the encouragement of terrorism.253 
Although encouraging terrorism is an offense which 
theoretically appears well-suited to deter the individuals of the alt-right 
responsible for radicalizing attackers like those in El Paso, London, 
and Christchurch, there is almost no known precedent for this. Even 
in the U.K., where the legal basis for doing so is fairly 
straightforward, only 23 of 809 (2.84%) terrorism-related charges 
brought since 2001 have cited encouraging terrorism as the principal 
offense.254 The practical difficulties inherent in prosecuting offenders 
would be enormous too. Attackers’ online history, text messages, 
emails, and the like would need to be collected and analyzed to 
determine if they did receive such encouragement and the identity of 
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the individuals providing it would need to be ascertained. Even if this 
is achieved, inciters residing overseas would need to be extradited to 
be tried, which is only possible if a similar offense exists in their 
home jurisdiction per the principle of dual criminality in international 
law.255 The content of the communications between the attacker and 
their inciter(s) would also need to sufficiently evidence the latter’s 
intent, hope, or belief terrorism would result to prove the requisite 
mens rea. Even in Osborne’s case, where such communications are 
well-documented, it appears unlikely Britain First’s or the EDL’s 
suggestions were provocative enough to meet this threshold. The 
process of radicalization they facilitate largely consists of persistent 
invitations to consider increasingly fringe ideas, and only thinly-veiled 
calls of action to a lesser extent. 
Ultimately, while segments of the alt-right bear all the 
hallmarks of a terrorist movement, these communities have been 
tremendously successful at capitalizing on the gaps in domestic 
terrorism laws to achieve their hateful agendas. Even individuals part 
of them that have committed devastating acts of violence which 
clearly meet the statutory definition of “terrorism” cannot directly be 
prosecuted as terrorists in the U.S. or the U.K.. The public-facing 
groups that deliberately reinforce the radical ideologies these 
attackers profess to the world through their manifestos cannot be 
outlawed because they strategically distance themselves from such 
zealous supporters. Although certain members of these groups do 
occasionally stray from making racist remarks into calling for 
violence, their contributions to the state of affairs which create such 
lone-wolf extremists has not resulted in criminal liability even though 
statutes designed to impose it currently exist. Accordingly, the alt-
right continues to flourish across the globe even though it has 
inspired some of the most senseless mass murders of the last decade. 
Attacks like those in El Paso, London, and Christchurch will 
continue unless acts of domestic terrorism are punished as such, the 
groups that radicalize their perpetrators are censured as a result, and 
the individuals at the forefront of these campaigns are held 
accountable as agitators. These attainable goals can be achieved by 
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ensuring that committing an act of domestic terrorism is a defined 
offense, that participation in and support for groups linked to them is 
criminalized, and laws which punish inciting such actions are 
enforceable. While the U.S., U.K., and New Zealand each have legal 
frameworks to accomplish some or all of these goals, they could be 
far better suited to addressing new terrorist threats from the alt-right.  
 
